Approximating Strategic Abilities under Imperfect Information: a Naive
  Approach by Jamroga, Wojciech et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
51
0.
06
58
7v
2 
 [c
s.M
A]
  3
0 A
ug
 20
16
Approximating Strategic Abilities under
Imperfect Information: a Naive Approach
Wojciech Jamroga, Michal Knapik, and Damian Kurpiewski
Institute of Computer Science,
Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
{w.jamroga,michal.knapik,damian.kurpiewski}@ipipan.waw.pl
Abstract. Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) allows to specify re-
quirements on abilities that different agents should (or should not) pos-
sess in a multi-agent system. However, model checking ATL specifica-
tions in realistic systems is computationally hard. In particular, if the
agents have imperfect information about the global state of the system,
the complexity ranges from ∆P2 to undecidable, depending on the syn-
tactic and semantic details. The problem is also hard in practice, as evi-
denced by several recent attempts to tackle it. On the other hand, model
checking of alternating epistemic mu-calculus can have a distinctly lower
computational complexity. In this work, we look at the idea of approxi-
mating the former problem by the verification of its “naive” translations
to the latter. In other words, we look at what happens when one uses the
(incorrect) fixpoint algorithm to verify formulae of ATL with imperfect
information.
1 Introduction
There is a growing number of works that study syntactic and semantic vari-
ants of strategic logics, in particular the alternating-time temporal logic ATL.
Conceptually, the most interesting strand builds upon reasoning about temporal
patterns and outcomes of strategic play, limited by information available to the
agents. The contributions are mainly theoretical, and include results concerning
the conceptual soundness of a given semantics of ability [17,9,1,13], meta-logical
properties [4], and the complexity of model checking [17,11,10]. However, there
is very little research on the actual use of the logics, in particular on practical
algorithms for reasoning and/or verification.
This is somewhat easy to understand, since model checking of ATL vari-
ants with imperfect information has been proved ∆P2 - to PSPACE-complete for
agents playing positional (a.k.a. memoryless) strategies [17,11] and undecidable
for agents with perfect recall of the past [7]. Moreover, the imperfect informa-
tion semantics of ATL does not admit fixpoint equivalences [4], which makes
incremental synthesis of strategies impossible, or at least difficult to achieve.
Some practical attempts at tackling the problem started to emerge only re-
cently [15,5,8]. Up until now, experimental results confirm that the initial intu-
ition was right: model checking strategic modalities for imperfect information is
hard, and dealing with it requires innovative algorithms and verification tech-
niques.
One idea that has not been properly explored is that of alternating-time
epistemic mu-calculus (AEµC) [3]. Since fixpoint equivalences do not hold un-
der imperfect information, it follows that standard fixpoint translations of ATL
modalities lead to a different interpretation of strategic ability. In fact, it can be
argued that they capture existence of recomputable winning strategies. However,
what especially interests us in the context of model checking is that they can
make model checking computationally cheaper. Verification of AEµC is in gen-
eral between NP and ∆P2 , but the scope of backtracking is much smaller than
for ATL with imperfect information, as it includes only the actions starting
from a given indistinguishability class rather than all the actions in the model.
Moreover, for coalitions of up to 2 agents the model checking problem is in P [3].
The question that we ask in this paper is: Is AEµC an attractive alternative
for verification of strategic abilities under imperfect information? To this end, we
will look at the naive AEµC approximations of formulae of ATLir (i.e., ATL
with imperfect information and imperfect recall), and investigate:
1. Whether model checking of theAEµC approximations performs significantly
faster than for the original ATLir formulae;
2. Whether the AEµC counterparts are indeed semantic approximations of the
ATLir specifications, or they encapsulate a completely different concept of
ability. As fixpoint equivalences are not valid for ATLir, we know that the
naive fixpoint translation is in general incorrect. However, one can possibly
ask: how often?
We take on an empirical approach. More precisely, we consider two classes
of benchmark models and formulae, one based on the Tian Ji scenario [14,5]
and the other being the Castles benchmark from [15]. Then, for a formula ϕ,
we compare the output and performance of the ATLir model checking of ϕ
with the AEµC model checking of aemc(ϕ), i.e., with the straightforward (and
generally incorrect) fixpoints approximation of ϕ. The work reported here is very
preliminary, but it already allows to draw some conclusions, and decide on the
most promising lines for future research.
2 What Agents Can Achieve under Imperfect Information
In this section we provide a brief overview of the relevant variants of ATL, and
the corresponding complexity results for model checking. We refer the interested
reader to [2,17,3] for details.
2.1 Models
The semantics for ATL is defined over a variant of transition systems where
transitions are labeled with combinations of actions, one per agent. An im-
perfect information concurrent game structure (ICGS) [2,17] is given by M =
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Fig. 1. Autonomous vehicles at the intersection: model M1
〈Agt, St,Π, pi,Act, d, o, {∼a| a ∈ Agt}〉 which includes a nonempty finite set of
all agents Agt = {1, . . . , k}, a nonempty set of states St, a set of atomic propo-
sitions Π and their valuation pi : Prop → 2St, and a nonempty finite set of
(atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt × St → 2Act defines nonempty sets of
actions available to agents at each state, and o is a (deterministic) transition
function that assigns the outcome state q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q and a
tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 for αi ∈ d(i, q) and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, that can be executed
by Agt in q. We write da(q) instead of d(a, q). Each ∼a⊆ St×St is an equivalence
relation satisfying da(q) = da(q
′) for q ∼a q
′. Note that perfect information can
be modeled by assuming each ∼a to be the minimal reflexive relation.
Example 1 (Intersection with limited visibility). Consider an intersection with
k autonomous vehicles around it. Each vehicle is modeled as a separate agent,
whose local state is characterized by either the proposition outi (when the vehicle
is outside the intersection) or ini (when the vehicle is inside it). The available
actions are: in (“drive in” or “stay in”, depending on the current state) and out
(“drive out” or “stay out”). Transitions update the state accordingly, except for
one case: when both agents are in and decide to leave at the same time, a collision
occurs (collision). Furthermore, let us assume that no agent sees the location of
the other vehicle.
Figure 1 presents a pointed ICGS modeling the scenario for k = 2. The
combinations of actions that are not displayed in the graph do not change the
state of the system. The indistinguishability relations are depicted by dotted
lines. ⊓⊔
A strategy of agent a is a conditional plan that specifies what a is going to
do in each situation. Here, we only refer to memoryless uniform strategies (ir
strategies in short), defined as functions sa : St → Act such that sa(q) ∈ da(q)
for all q, and q ∼a q
′ implies sa(q) = sa(q
′). A collective strategy sA is a tuple of
ir strategies, one per agent from A. A path λ = q0q1q2 . . . is an infinite sequence
of states such that there is a transition between each qi, qi+1. We use λ[i] to
denote the ith position on path λ (starting from i = 0) and λ[i,∞] to denote
the subpath of λ starting from i. Function outM (q, sA) returns the set of all
paths that can result from the execution of strategy sA from state q in model
M , defined formally as follows:
out(q, sA) = {λ = q0, q1, q2 . . . | q0 = q and for each i = 0, 1, . . . there exists
〈αia1 , . . . , α
i
ak
〉 such that αia ∈ da(qi) for every a ∈ Agt, and α
i
a = sA[a](qi)
for every a ∈ A, and qi+1 = o(qi, α
i
a1
, . . . , αiak)}.
Moreover, we define outirM (q, sA) =
⋃
a∈A
⋃
q∼aq′
outM (q
′, sA). We will omit the
subscript M if it is clear from the context.
2.2 Alternating Time Temporal Logic
Let Agt be the set of agents and Prop be the set of atomic propositions. The
language of ATL is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ | 〈〈A〉〉Gϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ
where A ⊆ Agt and p ∈ Prop. Additionally, we define “sometime in the future”
as Fϕ ≡ ⊤Uϕ. The semantics of ATLir is defined by the following clauses:
M, q |= p iff q ∈ pi(p) (where p ∈ Π);
M, q |= ¬ϕ iff M, q 6|= ϕ;
M, q |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q |= ϕ and M, q |= ψ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ iff there is a collective strategy sA such that, for each λ ∈
outir(q, sA), M,λ[1] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉Gϕ iff there is a collective strategy sA such that, for each λ ∈
outir(q, sA) and every i ≥ 0, M,λ[i] |= ϕ;
M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ iff there is sA such that, for each λ ∈ out
ir(q, sA), there is
i ≥ 0 for which M,λ[i] |= ψ, and M,λ[j] |= ϕ for each 0 ≤ j < i.
Informally, M, q |= 〈〈A〉〉γ iff there exists a strategy for A such that γ holds on
all the paths that the agents in A consider as possible executions of the strategy.
Example 2 (Intersection with limited visibility, ctd.). Take model M1 from Ex-
ample 1. Now, we have e.g. that M1, qoo |= 〈〈1〉〉G¬collision (it suffices that agent
1 executes action “out” regardless of anything). On the other hand, M1, qoo |=
¬〈〈1, 2〉〉Fcollision (the agents do not know how to make sure that a collision will
happen, even if they want to). We leave it up to the interested reader to check
the latter. ⊓⊔
2.3 Verification of Strategic Abilities
The model checking problem asks, given a modelM , a state q in it, and a logical
formula ϕ, whether ϕ holds in M, q. ATL verification is known to be tractable
for perfect information models, but intractable for imperfect information.
Proposition 1 ([17,12]). Model checking of ATLir is ∆
P
2 -complete in the num-
ber of states and transitions in the model, and the length of the formula.
2.4 Alternating Epistemic Mu-Calculus
Alternating epistemic µ-calculus (AEµC) replaces the temporal-strategic oper-
ators 〈〈A〉〉G, 〈〈A〉〉U with the least fixpoint operator µ [3]:
ϕ ::= p | Z | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉Xϕ | µZ.ϕ
where Z ∈ Var is a second order variable ranging over sets of states. The great-
est fixed point operator ν can be defined as dual to µ. We consider only the
alternation-free fragment of AEµC, cf. [2,3] for the exact definition.
A valuation of Var is a mapping V : Var→ 2St. Given a set Q ⊆ St of states
we define V [Z := Q] as the update of V that assigns Q to Z. The semantics
of AEµC is given by the denotation function [[ϕ]]MV which defines the set of
states in M that satisfy ϕ in the following way: [[p]]MV = pi(p), [[Z]]
M
V = V(Z),
[[¬ϕ]]MV = St \ [[ϕ]]
M
V , [[ϕ ∧ ψ]]
M
V = [[ϕ]]
M
V ∩ [[ψ]]
M
V , [[〈〈A〉〉Xϕ]]
M
V = {q | ∃αA ∈
dA(q)∀αAgt\A ∈ dAgt\A : o(q, (αA, αAgt\A)) ∈ [[ϕ]]
M
V }, and [[µZ.ϕ]]
M
V =
⋂
{Q ⊆
St | [[ϕ]]MV[Z:=Q] ⊆ Q}. Moreover, M, q |= ϕ iff q ∈ [[ϕ]]
M
V for all valuations V .
Proposition 2 ([3]). Model checking of AEµC is P-complete if all the coali-
tions in ϕ consist of at most 2 agents. For abilities of coalitions with 3 or more
agents, it is between NP and ∆P2 in the size of the largest abstraction class of
relations ∼1, . . . ,∼k.
Thus, verification of AEµC is potentially more attractive than ATLir. A
natural idea is to use the naive translation ofATLir toAEµC, defined as follows:
aemc(p) = p
aemc(¬ϕ) = ¬aemc(ϕ)
aemc(ϕ ∧ ψ) = aemc(ϕ) ∧ aemc(ψ)
aemc(〈〈A〉〉Xϕ) = 〈〈A〉〉Xaemc(ϕ)
aemc(〈〈A〉〉Gϕ) = νZ.(aemc(ϕ) ∧ 〈〈A〉〉XZ)
aemc(〈〈A〉〉Fϕ) = µZ.(aemc(ϕ) ∨ 〈〈A〉〉XZ)
aemc(〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ) = µZ.(aemc(ψ) ∨ aemc(ϕ) ∧ 〈〈A〉〉XZ).
We will look at how it works in the subsequent sections.
Note that, in a way, aemc(〈〈A〉〉Fϕ) expresses a persistent ability to achieve
ϕ. Likewise, aemc(〈〈A〉〉Gϕ expresses a persistent ability to maintain ϕ. This
is because aemc(〈〈A〉〉Fϕ) produces a strategy for A such that aemc(〈〈A〉〉Fϕ)
will also hold for every state reachable by the strategy. For aemc(〈〈A〉〉Gϕ) the
situation is analogous.
3 Fixpoint Approximation of Strategic Ability:
Performance
In this section, we empirically compare the performance of model checkingATLir
specifications vs. their naive AEµC approximations.
The experimental results on the AEµC side have been obtained by running
a straightforward implementation of the fixpoint model checking algorithm, im-
plemented in Python 3. The tests have been conducted on a MacBook with an
Intel Core i5 CPU with dynamic clock speed of 1.4 GHz, 4 GB of RAM (one
module DDR3, 1600 MHz buz clock), and OS X 10.10.5 Yosemite.
The performance of ATLir model checking for the Castles model is cited
after [16], and was obtained on a notebook with an Intel Core i7-3630QM CPU
with dynamic clock speed of 2.4 GHz up to 3.4 GHz, and 8 GB of RAM (two
modules DDR3 PC3-12800, 800 MHz bus clock, effective data rate 1600 MT/s, in
dual-channel configuration). Two model checkers were used: SMC and MCMAS.
The experiments with SMC were conducted on Windows 7 OS, the experiments
with MCMAS on Linux Ubuntu 12.04.2. Thus, the ATLir model checking for
Castles was performed on a significantly better computing equipment than the
AEµC verification. We also note that SMC uses several reduction techniques to
restrict the search space, and MCMAS operates on compact symbolic represen-
tations of models, based on BDD’s. In contrast, our model checking of AEµC
was done with a straightforward implementation of the standard explicit state
algorithm with no optimizations at all.
The performance of ATLir model checking for the TianJi model is cited
after [5], and was obtained with an experimental model checker implemented
with PyNuSMV, a Python framework for prototyping and experimenting with
BDD-based model-checking algorithms based on NuSMV [6].1 Besides compact
symbolic representations of states and transitions, the model checker features
multiple optimization techniques. The authors do not describe the computing
configuration that was used for their experiments.
The timeout in all cases is defined as 120 minutes.
3.1 Benchmark 1: Castles
The Castles model have been proposed in [15]. The model consists of one agent
called Environment that keeps track of the health points of three castles, plus
1 It should be mentioned that the results for TianJi in [5] were obtained for a slightly
different semantics of ATLir, employing additional fairness constraints.
AEµC (ψ′1) ATLir/SMC(ψ1) ATLir/MCMAS(ψ1)
Configuration time #sat #iter time time
4 (1,1,1) 0.011 128 1 timeout 72
5 (1,1,2) 0.024 256 1 timeout timeout
6 (2,1,2) 0.386 512 1 timeout timeout
7 (2,2,2) 9.231 1024 1 timeout timeout
8 (3,2,2) 4352.891 5504 2 timeout timeout
Fig. 2. Model checking performance for Castles, formula ψ′1 vs. ψ1
AEµC (ψ′2) ATLir/SMC(ψ2) ATLir/MCMAS(ψ2)
Configuration time #sat #iter time time
4 (1,1,1) 0.004 8 1 timeout 78
5 (1,1,2) 0.015 16 1 timeout error
6 (2,1,2) 0.050 32 1 ? ?
7 (2,2,2) 0.225 64 1 ? ?
8 (3,2,2) 1.202 128 1 ? ?
Fig. 3. Model checking performance for Castles, formula ψ′2 vs. ψ2. “?” indicates lack
of data about the performance of the given model checker on the given instance.
a number of agents called Workers each of whom works for the benefit of a
castle. Health points (HP, ranging from 0 to 3) represent the current condition
of the castle; 0 HP means that the castle is defeated. Workers can execute the
following actions: attack a castle they do not work for, defend the castle they do
work for, or do nothing. Doing nothing is the only available action to a Worker
of a defeated castle. No agent can defend its castle twice in a row, it must
wait one step before being able to defend again. A castle gets damaged if the
number of attackers is greater than the number of defenders, and the damage is
equal to the difference. In the initial state, all the castles have 3 HP and every
Worker can engage in defending its castle. The indistinguishability relations for
Workers are defined as follows. Every Worker knows if it can currently engage in
defending its castle, and can observe for each castle if it is defeated or not. The
model is parameterized by the number of agents and the allocation of Workers.
For example, an instance with 1 worker assigned to the first castle, 3 workers
assigned to the second and 4 to the third castle will be denoted by 9 (1,3,4).
Formulae We considered the following formulas for Castles:
ψ1 ≡ 〈〈c12〉〉Fcastle3defeated
ψ2 ≡ 〈〈w12〉〉FallDefeated
The first formula says that the workers working for castles 1 and 2 have a collec-
tive strategy to defeat castle 3, no matter what other agents do. Similarly, the
second formula says that workers number 1 and 2 have a collective strategy to
AEµC (φ′1) ATLir (φ1)
Horses time #sat #iter time
3 0.0002 11 2 2.603
4 0.001 18 2 8.205
5 0.014 153 3 30.885
6 0.024 300 3 99.931
7 0.753 2258 4 586.126
8 6.204 4900 4 ?
Fig. 4. Model checking performance for TianJi, formula φ′1 vs. φ1
AEµC (φ′2) ATLir (φ2)
Horses time #sat #iter time
3 0.0002 0 2 ≈ 2.5
4 0.001 0 2 ≈ 10
5 0.003 0 2 ≈ 650
6 0.004 0 2 ?
7 0.016 0 2 ?
8 0.075 0 2 ?
Fig. 5. Model checking performance for TianJi, formula φ′2 vs. φ2
ensure the defeat of all castles. After the naive translation to AEµC we obtain:
ψ′1 ≡ µZ.(castle3defeated ∨ 〈〈c12〉〉XZ)
ψ′2 ≡ µZ.(allDefeated ∨ 〈〈w12〉〉XZ)
Experimental Results The results for Castles are presented in Figures 2 and
3. The tables present results for a sequence of models of various sizes. The column
headers are interpreted as follows:
– time: model checking time (in seconds),
– #sat: number of states in which the formula is satisfied,
– #iter: number of iterations until reaching fixpoint. Note: we only have data
about #sat and #iter for the experiments with AEµC model checking.
3.2 Benchmark 2: TianJi
The second series of experiments has been conducted for the TianJi variant
from [5]. The model consists of two agents: Tian Ji and the king. Each agent
has n horses numbered 1, . . . , n. In the game, Tian Ji and the king send their
horses one by one against each other. Horse i of Tian Ji wins the race with king’s
horse j iff i > j. At each stage, the agents know the current score and their own
remaining horses, but not those of the opponent. Moreover, the decisions at each
round are made simultaneously, so one does not know which horse is currently
sent by the other player. The player whose horses won most races wins the game.
Configuration AEµC (ψ′1) ATLir (ψ1)
4 (1,1,1) false true
5 (1,1,2) false true
6 (2,1,2) false true
6 (3,1,1) true true
7 (2,2,2) false true
8 (3,2,2) true true
Fig. 6. Model checking output for Castles, formula ψ′1 vs. ψ1
We considered the following formulas for TianJi:
φ1 := 〈〈TJ 〉〉FTJWins
φ2 := 〈〈TJ 〉〉G〈〈TJ 〉〉XTJWonLess2
TJWins holds when the game is done and TianJi has won more races than the
king. Similarly, TJWonLess2 is satisfied when TianJi has won at most 1 race up
to the current point. After the naive translation we obtain:
φ′1 := µZ.(TJWins ∨ 〈〈TJ 〉〉XZ)
φ′2 := νZ.(〈〈TJ 〉〉XTJWonLess2 ∧ 〈〈TJ 〉〉XZ)
The results of experiments are presented in Figures 4 and 5.
3.3 Discussion
The experimental results show that, for the instances of model checking that we
have tested, verification of strategic abilities in alternating epistemic µ-calculus
offers a dramatic speedup over model checking “standard” ATL with imperfect
information. So, from the computational point of view, AEµC is definitely more
attractive than ATLir. The speedup occurs despite the fact that the AEµC
model checking was done by a straightforward implementation of the standard
explicit state algorithm, while the results for ATLir were obtained by model
checkers that use multiple optimization techniques and, in most cases, also com-
pact symbolic representation of states and transitions in the model.
We also note that AEµC model checking was distinctly faster than that of
ATLir even when they were both (theoretically) NP-complete, i.e., for coalitions
larger than 2 agents (cf. Figure 2).
4 Fixpoint Approximation of Strategic Ability: Semantics
In this section, we empirically compare the output of model checking ATLir
with that of model checking AEµC. That is, we compare the truth values of
ATLir specifications in the benchmark models, versus the truth values of their
naive fixpoint approximations. The output of AEµC model checking has been
produced by our model checking algorithm. The truth values according to the
ATLir semantics were determined by hand.
Configuration AEµC (ψ′2) ATLir (ψ2)
4 (1,1,1) false false
5 (1,1,2) false false
6 (2,1,2) false false
6 (3,1,1) false false
7 (2,2,2) false false
8 (3,2,2) false false
Fig. 7. Model checking output for Castles, formula ψ′2 vs. ψ2
Horses AEµC (φ′1) ATLir (φ1)
3 false false
4 false false
5 false false
6 false false
7 false false
8 false false
Fig. 8. Model checking output for TianJi, formula φ′1 vs. φ1
4.1 Benchmarks 1 & 2: Castles and TianJi
The results for Castles are presented in Figures 6 and 7. The tables present the
truth values of a given formula in the initial state of the benchmark model of
a given size. Similarly, the output of model checking for TianJi is presented in
Figures 8 and 9.
4.2 Benchmark 3: Modified TianJi
The experiments with Castles have shown that the AEµC approximations cap-
ture a much more restrictive notion of ability than the original ATLir specifica-
tions. In this view, the results in Figures 8 and 9 are not very informative. Both
semantics have produced the same truth values, but was it because they are
indeed so close? Or rather because the ATLir semantics incidentally produced
“false,” i.e., the truth value that the fixpoint semantics seems to favor?
To answer this question, we have prepared and executed an additional run of
experiments based on a modification of the TianJi story. In “Modified TianJi,”
general TianJi always sees the horse selected by the king before sending his
own horse to the next race. The modification significantly increases the strategic
abilities of the general. The results are presented in Figure 10.
4.3 Discussion
The experiments show that using AEµC to approximate model checking of
ATLir in a straightforward way does not work. There is no correlation between
the truth of the ATLir formulae that we have tested, and their naive AEµC
Horses AEµC (φ′2) ATLir (φ2)
3 false false
4 false false
5 false false
6 false false
7 false false
8 false false
Fig. 9. Model checking output for TianJi, formula φ′2 vs. φ2
Horses AEµC (φ′1) ATLir (φ1)
3 false true
4 false true
5 false true
6 false true
7 false true
8 false true
Horses AEµC (φ′2) ATLir (φ2)
3 false true
4 false true
5 false true
6 false true
7 false true
8 false true
Fig. 10. Model checking output for Modified TianJi
translations. In fact, the latter ones did not hold in an overwhelming majority of
models that we looked at. This is due to the fact that persistent or recomputable
strategic ability is a much stronger property than being able to come up with a
winning strategy only in the initial state of the game.
This suggests two possible ways of further study. One is to identify subclasses
of concurrent game structures where recomputable strategies can be obtained.
Models of agents with perfect recall seem a natural candidate in this respect.
The other is to suitably weaken the AEµC translations so that they capture
also existence of (some) non-recomputable strategies. We leave exploration of
both paths for future research.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have looked at verification of strategic abilities for agents
with imperfect information. The aim was to investigate whether straightforward
fixpoint approximations provide an interesting alternative to formulae of ATLir,
for which model checking is known to be theoretically and practically hard. The
answer is both yes and no. On one hand, our experimental results show that
verification of “fixpoint abilities,” specified in alternating epistemic µ-calculus,
offers a dramatic speedup over model checking of ATLir. On the other hand,
there is no correlation between satisfaction of the ATLir formulae that we have
tested, and their naive AEµC translations. Thus, we conclude that AEµC is an
attractive alternative toATLir from the computational point of view, but it does
not approximate model checking of ATLir in a straightforward way. Rather, it
is underpinned by a distinctly different notion of ability, based on existence of
persistent or recomputable strategies.
In the future, we plan to identify subclasses of concurrent game structures
where such recomputable strategies can be obtained. We will also investigate
how to weaken the fixpoint translations so that they capture also existence of
some non-recomputable strategies.
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